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Abstract
This paper empirically revisits the relationships between decentralisation, regional au-
tonomy and ethnic civil war. On the one hand, decentralisation and autonomy may allow
ethnic minorities to directly control their own affairs or to better hold regional rulers
to account. On the other hand, decentralisation and autonomy in multi-ethnic coun-
tries may foster centrifugal forces and bestow legitimacy and resources to secessionist
groups. Current evidence from cross-country or cross-ethnic group econometric studies
are limited by crude operationalisation of decentralisation and often questionable treat-
ment of endogeneity. The paper makes three key contributions: i) it builds a new dataset
bringing together up-to-date and cutting edge data on decentralisation and autonomy
(RAI) and ethnic group violence (EPR), thereby providing new insights on groups expo-
sure to decentralisation in 81 countries between 1945 and 2010; ii) it tests how various
facets of decentralisation (autonomy, self-rule, shared-rule, political decentralisation) re-
late to ethnic violence; and iii) it exploits dynamic panel data techniques, namely the
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difference-GMM estimator, to account for reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity
biases. The validity and strength of the estimator are explicitly established. I find that
regional autonomy - even when decentralisation is otherwise limited - strongly reduces
the incidence of ethnic civil wars. The conflict-mitigating effect of autonomy is maxi-
mal when regional governments command substantial powers in terms of policy-setting
and when political decentralisation is strong. Political decentralisation is also found to
be a strong and consistent factor of ethnic peace in the absence of regional autonomy.
In contrast, granting regional governments wide-ranging authorities on policy and fiscal
matters does not reduce the incidence of large-scale ethnic conflict on its own. Granting
autonomy to regional governments which have no substantial powers of self-rule is weakly
correlated with higher chances of onset of civil wars but a combination of autonomy and
above-median self-rule and political decentralisation strongly reduces such a likelihood.
Regional autonomy appears to be the only effective strategy to stop existing civil wars.
Keywords: Decentralisation, autonomy, civil wars, dynamic panel data analysis.
1 Introduction
Since the second world war, the bulk of violent conflicts are within countries and often
involve ethnic groups. Secessionist wars alone make up about one quarter of all civil wars
since the end of WW2 (Wimmer, Cederman & Min 2009). Ethnic civil wars also tend to
be protracted. For instance, the Moros have been at war in the Philippines every year
bar one since 1970. The Catholics in Northern Ireland have continuously been at war
between 1971 and 1998, as have the Mayas in Guatemala between 1975 and 1995. Ethnic
minorities that are spatially concentrated and can claim an area of the country as their
own are considerably more likely to rebel (Fearon & Laitin 1999).
What role does decentralisation play in the participation of such groups in large-scale
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conflict? Does it prevent (or mitigate) the risk of war; or does it fuel it? The question
is of interest given the general push towards decentralised governance in international
development (Fritzen 2007) and among richer countries (OECD 2013); and because de-
centralisation is often explicitly called for as a peace-promoting or conflict-mitigating
strategy. Decentralisation is also more common in ethnically fragmented countries, which
are most likely to harbour secessionist tendencies (Arzaghi & Henderson 2005).
There is an abundant literature discussing the merits and pitfalls of decentralisa-
tion (political, fiscal and administrative), regional autonomy and federalism as peace-
promoting devices. Proponents of decentralisation tend to stress that ethnic minorities
are usually excluded from the political centre, which fuel anger and mobilisation (Lijphart
1977, Gurr 1994, Lustick, Miodownik & Eidelson 2004, Nordquist 1998, Hechter 2000).
Shifting power to regional governments allows spatially concentrated minorities to con-
trol their own affairs, thereby improving welfare and reducing the relative deprivation
of their members. Opponents argue that decentralisation legitimises and freezes sub-
national identities (Kymlicka 1998), gives institutional and financial resources to seces-
sionist groups (Bunce 1999, Cornell 2002), strengthen regional parties (Brancati 2006)
and generally foster centrifugal forces and ethnic conflict.
Findings of econometric studies tend to suggest a favourable yet conditional role of
decentralisation on conflict. Results by Brancati (2006) and Bakke & Wibbels (2006)
suggest that countries which are more decentralised and/or federal experience lower risk
of civil wars or ethnic rebellion. The effect is however conditional on regional inequalities
being not too large and regional parties not too strong. Tranchant (2008) finds that ethnic
groups living in fiscally decentralised countries are less likely to engage in rebellion and
communal violence but only in countries sufficiently rich and in which state power is not
too pronounced. A similar result obtains when one looks at comparisons within a single
country. Murshed, Tadjoeddin & Chowdhury (2009) shows that districts in Java where
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fiscal decentralisation had a larger impact are less affected by routine violence, but the
effect is limited to wealthy districts. Brown (2009) suggests that administrative regions
which enjoy more policy-making authority experience less ethnic protest and rebellion.
Regarding regional autonomy, Cederman, Hug, Schadel & Wucherpfennig (2015) show
that groups with some degree of territorial autonomy are less likely to participate in civil
wars but Christin & Hug (2012) find that countries with a strong ethnofederal structure
are more prone to civil wars.
The current empirical literature on the topic has three common flaws. First, most
studies do not explicitly address endogeneity concerns and rely on simple pooled esti-
mations or fixed effects.1 Second, studies either use a group-level analysis but with a
nationally defined measure of decentralisation, or are set-up in a cross-country frame-
work which hides relevant heterogeneity within countries. Yet, decentralisation is not
uniformly implemented within countries. Third, studies tend to use a blunt measure of
decentralisation such as the share of sub-national expenditures and ignore the relation-
ships between different facets of decentralisation and autonomy. Cederman et al. (2015)
deal with the first two flaws but leave decentralisation out of their analysis to solely focus
on territorial autonomy. Brown (2009) uses the same fine-grained data on decentralisa-
tion that I use, but he does not look at large-scale conflict and does not fully address the
issue of reverse causality.
The main contribution of the paper is to address all three limitations. To do that, I
match information on the authority of regional governments (from the Regional Autonomy
Index dataset, RAI) with the Ethno-Power Relations (EPR) dataset to generate a group-
level dataset on decentralisation, regional autonomy and civil war. For each ethnic group
in the dataset I also identify whether it is a local majority within the boundaries of the
regional governments it can lay a claim on. The RAI dataset provides very fine-grained
1Some exceptions are Tranchant (2008), Christin & Hug (2012) and Cederman et al. (2015).
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information on the authority of all significant tiers of regional governments in 81 counties
between 1950 and 2010. The dataset informs on regional governments’ authority in terms
of self-rule (how much power do regional governments have in matters of regional policy?),
shared-rule (how much power do regional governments have in matters of national policy?)
and regional autonomy (is the relationship between the regional government and the
centre governed by a bilateral treaty?). Self-rule can even be disaggregated into policy,
tax autonomy and representation components. The representation component refers to
the ability of individuals to choose their leaders in regional governments; it is thus close
in spirit to political decentralisation. To my knowledge, only Brown (2009) has used the
dataset to study ethnic conflict, probably because until recently the geographical coverage
of dataset was much more limited.
The paper provides a conceptual framework to generate predictions on how self-rule,
shared-rule and regional autonomy of regional governments influence the likelihood that
ethnic groups participate in civil wars. I then use difference GMM estimations to test
these predictions. I claim that the the difference GMM estimator is the most credible
one to deal with unobserved heterogeneity, reverse causality and conflict dynamics and
to provide consistent estimates of the effect of decentralisation and regional autonomy on
ethnic civil wars.
The dynamic panel data analysis yields six main results. First, regional autonomy
is significantly associated with a lower risk of ethnic civil war. This is true even when
decentralisation is limited, i.e. when the autonomous regional governments have little
substantive powers. Second, political decentralisation (measured by the ability of re-
gional voters to choose their leaders) is also a strong and robust factor preventing civil
wars. Third, regional autonomy reaches a maximal effect when regional governments com-
mand self-rule powers (notably in terms of policy) and when political decentralisation is
substantial. Fourth, granting regional governments wide-ranging authority on policy or
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taxes does not in itself reduce (or fuel) the risk of conflict. Fifth, shared-rule is never
significantly associated with incidence of civil wars. It is worth noting that the effect of
regional autonomy is only significantly different from zero once it is instrumented (here
through the use the difference GMM estimator). This is consistent with the view that
autonomy is a strategic response used by central governments when faced with risks of
ethnic violence. The magnitudes of the impact of decentralisation and regional autonomy
on conflict are very substantial. Fifth, the combination of autonomy with above-median
self-rule of regional governments (notably in terms of policy-setting and fiscal authority)
and political decentralisation strongly reduces the risk of onset of civil wars. Autonomy
status without meaningful decentralisation is weakly associated with higher chances of
onset. Sixthly, only regional autonomy (irrespective of decentralisation) appears to be a
strong and statistically significant factor of conflict termination.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops a con-
ceptual framework linking decentralisation and regional autonomy to groups’ propensity
to engage in conflict. In section 3 I describe how I built the dataset and section 4 lays
out the empirical strategy. Sections 5 and 7 present the findings of the estimations of the
effect of decentralisation and regional autonomy on incidence and onset/continuation of
conflict, respectively. Section 8 discusses the results and concludes.
2 Decentralisation and ethnic conflict: A Con-
ceptual framework
2.1 Literature review
A significant tradition in political science contends that shifting decision-making power
to local and regional governments can help prevent or manage ethnic conflicts (Lijphart
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1977, Gurr 1994, Lustick, Miodownik & Eidelson 2004, Nordquist 1998, Hechter 2000).
Ethnic minorities are often separated from the political centre by a large geographic
and social distance. They are also too small to become major members of political
coalitions in power. It follows that decisions at the national level seldom reflect the
preferences of these minorities. Political exclusion of minorities - which is also often due
to systematic discriminations against them - is widely thought to fuel violent mobilisation
(Gurr 1970, Lijphart 1977, Lijphart 1996, Horowitz 1985). For instance, Gurr’s relative
deprivation argument implies that members of an excluded ethnic group are likely to
feel aggrieved by their lot and subsequently turn violent. Lijphart and Horowitz call
for inclusive governance, or “consociationalism” in the words of the former, to promote
peace. The link between exclusion and conflict has found some empirical validation in
quantitative studies conducted by Gurr (1994), Wimmer, Cederman & Min (2009) or
Cederman, Wimmer & Min (2010).2
In this context, shifting part of the decision-making authority to regional governments
allows minorities to implement policies that reflect their preferences, and helps overcome
exclusion from the centre. Decentralisation is then seen as a form of power-sharing -
between national and regional tiers of governments - and as such an avenue to prevent or
manage ethnic conflicts. According to this line of argument, the more concentrated and
locally dominant ethnic groups are, and the more excluded they are from national-level
decision-making, the higher the potential for decentralisation to prevent or reduce ethnic
violence.
Applying an economics lens to decentralisation and ethnic conflict leads to similar con-
clusions. In traditional models of decentralisation, such as in Oates (1972), centralised
provision of public goods is uniform and comes at a cost when preferences are hetero-
2Other studies have failed to find a link between overall inequalities, or “grievances”, and conflict (e.g. Collier
& Hoeﬄer 2004). However, these studies are typically conducted at the country level and do not directly test
the argument that excluded groups are likely to use violence.
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geneous across the territory. It is also common in economics to posit that preferences
vary across ethnic groups (e.g. Alesina, Baqir & Easterly 1999) or geographical areas
(Tiebout 1956, Panizza 1999). By essence, ethnic minorities which are geographically
and socially distant from the majority are likely to develop specific preferences over the
type and quantity of public goods.3 Even without preference heterogeneity, however,
centralised provision may be costly in the presence of spatially concentrated ethnic mi-
norities. Public goods may hardly reach ethnic minorities if there is a large “spatial decay”
in the provision of the public good (Panizza 1999).4 This may occur if it is difficult for
the central authority to monitor the provision of services over long distances (for instance
if distance creates opportunities for corruption) or if the implementation of the services
needs to be tweaked to account for local specificities (for instance, supplying education
in sparsely populated rural communities is a different task than doing so in cities even if
preferences for education are the same across the country).
Seabright (1996) proposes a framework in which the advantage of decentralisation is
not to tailor specific policies across the national territory, but to raise accountability. In
centralisation, the welfare of a minority group does not strongly influence the re-election
prospects of the ruler as the vote is national. In decentralisation, the welfare of minority
groups can directly influence the re-election prospect of the ruler as the vote is regional. As
minority groups can hold regional government accountable, and provided that a significant
share of policy-making is assumed by regional governments, the quality of government
should improve. Similar to Oates (1972), the main drawback of decentralisation is the
loss of policy coordination.
The limits of decentralisation are both economic and political. Economists stress the
risks of loss of coordination and efficiency in providing the public good through local
3Lieberman & McClendon (2013) show that indeed preferences are systematically related to ethnicity in
Africa.
4Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner & Weinstein (2007) suggest that preferences do not vary with ethnicity
within slums of Kampala.
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governments. Some public goods are characterised by economies of scale, so that the
larger the provision of the good, the cheaper its unit cost. Decentralisation imposes a
cost by breaking up the provision of public goods into multiple suppliers. This justifies
the central provision of goods for which economies of scale are important, such as defence
(Musgrave 1959, Gordon 1983). Bardhan & Mookherjee (2000, 2005) note that local
governments are vulnerable to elite capture as powerful local elites have more influence
on local governments than national elites have on central governments. It may be that
the costs due to the capture of local governments (to which decentralisation is vulnerable)
dominate the costs due to bureaucratic corruption (to which centralisation is vulnerable).
Some political scientists argue that decentralisation across ethnic lines, in the form of
ethnofederalism, where some regions dominated by specific ethnic groups are granted a
large degree of autonomy, cannot contain ethnic conflict. For instance, Kymlicka (1998)
contends that ethnofederalism might reinforce ethnic identities and undermine nation-
building. Hale (2004) argues that ethnofederal systems with a dominant core are unstable.
Regional autonomy can also foster the legitimacy of separatist demands and provide
institutional resources for minorities to continue secessionist conflict (Bunce 1999, Cornell
2002). Brancati (2006) argues that decentralisation strengthen regional parties which, in
turn, fosters centrifugal forces.
2.2 Ethnic minorities, decentralisation and the threat of
secession
I now use the arguments discussed above to generate predictions on the relationships
between decentralisation and ethnic conflict at the level of the ethnic group. Following
Buchanan & Faith (1987), Panizza (1999), Arzaghi & Henderson (2005) and Sambanis
& Milanovic (2014), I start by asking whether regionally concentrated minorities prefer
union or separation, i.e. to stay in a polity alongside a majority region or to seek in-
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dependence. As Fearon & Laitin (1999) indicate, a large proportion of ethnic conflicts
involve regionally concentrated minorities, precisely because these groups can credibly
seek exit from the country.5. If members of the minority group assess that their expected
welfare in the union is lower than their expected welfare under separation (accounting
for the cost and benefits of conflict), then conflict will prevail. Groups most likely to
engage in violent conflict are thus those for which exit is viable, i.e. large, concentrated
and locally dominant groups which can credibly set up a separate country; and those for
which welfare in the union is low, i.e. groups very distant from the central government
and/or groups living in very centralised countries.6
Ethnic groups can also engage in ethnic violence even if secession is not their goal
or is infeasible. In this case, rebellion will aim to influence policy, towards less politi-
cal exclusion and more decentralisation/autonomy. Groups that are excluded from the
centre and live in centralised countries are therefore likely to engage in violence (to ob-
tain regional autonomy) even if they are too small or not locally dominant enough to
successfully secede.
Central governments value territorial integrity and are unwilling to let minorities
secede. Many governments are wary of granting autonomy to minority groups out of fear
it will be perceived as a step towards independence or a means to legitimate nationalist
demands from other groups (Cornell 2002, Toft 2003). In keeping with the public choice
school, central governments also value concentrating decision-making power into their own
hands. An unrestrained public Leviathan will then try to maintain the territorial integrity
of the polity while centralising spending as much as possible. However, the threat (or cost)
of secessionist conflict can become so large that central governments will be willing to
5Wimmer, Cederman & Min (2009) calculate that 53% of ethnic conflicts worldwide since the second world
war were secessionist
6Perez-Sebastian & Raveh (2014) also suggest that separation can be costly as smaller geographical areas
are vulnerable to shocks. Perhaps contrary to common wisdom, their model suggests that resource-rich regions
may find it beneficial to remain in a larger union in order to mitigate the costs of price volatility.
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decentralise/grant autonomy status to minorities to prevent or stop the conflict. Flamand
(2015) theoretically shows that under a range of parameters, decentralisation can deter
secessionist conflict and that the level of decentralisation actually implemented by the
central government is related to the chance that secessionist conflicts succeed.
2.3 Shared rule and conflict
The arguments I have just presented pertain to the self-rule features of decentralisation.
Self-rule refers to the degree of autonomy from the centre that regional governments enjoy
in fiscal matters and the design of policy. Elazar (1987) and Rodden (2004), among others,
have stressed that decentralisation can also be characterised by the extent of shared-rule
enjoyed by subunits. Shared-rule refers to the extent to which regional governments have
a say in the making of national-level legislation and policy. The Regional Autonomy
Index (RAI) that will be used in the empirical section documents the extent of shared-
rule enjoyed by regional governments, and Brown (2009) found that shared-rule features
of decentralisation explain patterns of ethnopolitical protest.
Conceptually, the role of shared-rule in managing ethnic conflict is very distinct from
that of self-rule. Instead of alleviating the risk of violence by empowering regional gov-
ernments with policy and fiscal authority (which is the avenue of self-rule), shared rule
operates by giving regional government power over the national policy-making process.
If regional governments have the capacity to block harmful policies from the centre, then
political exclusion from the centre is less likely to translate into secessionist conflict.
Posen (1993) contends that in multi-ethnic countries, each ethnic group sees the others
as potential threats to its security. In situations where an overarching authority is weak
or absent, or when the balance of forces between groups is unclear, every groups fear
that it will be attacked and it can be rational to strike first. This is the “ethnic security
dilemma”. Ethnic minorities facing a weak or a predatory state are in acute security
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dilemma, which may trigger secessionist conflict. Shared-rule, by giving, say, veto power
to autonomous regional governments, is a potential solution to the security dilemma.
More generally, shared-rule is at the heart of the idea of ethnofederalism as a peace-
preserving mechanisms as it is meant to both protect regional minorities from security
threats and encourage decentralised subunits to contribute to national policy-making and
build a sense of overarching national identity (Horowitz 1985, Hale 2004, Brown 2010).
2.4 Decentralisation and regional autonomy
So far I have mentioned both decentralisation and regional autonomy and used the terms
almost interchangeably. Although decentralisation and autonomy tend to go hand in
hand, some regional governments enjoy wide authority on say, policy and taxes, but
do not have special autonomy status (e.g. the States in the USA or the cantons in
Switzerland). Conversely, some regional governments have a special status but enjoy
relatively limited degree of control (e.g. Tobago in Trinidad and Tobago and the Region
Autonoma del Sur and Region Autonoma del Norte in Nicaragua).
In addition, regional autonomy implies the notion of asymmetry. By definition, au-
tonomous regions have a special status with the centre which sets them apart from other
regions in a country. Decentralisation need not be uniformly implemented and the au-
thority of some regional governments may be higher than others (even within the same
tier of regional government) but the degree of asymmetry is clearly lower when one refers
to decentralisation than to autonomy.
It is clear that increasing the authority of all regional governments (decentralisation)
need not have the same effect on conflict than increasing the autonomy of one particular
regional government (regional autonomy). The argument of Cornell (2002) that regional
autonomy fails to contain ethnic violence is applicable to the concept of regional autonomy
(whose implementation is asymmetric) but not to the concept of decentralisation (whose
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implementation within a given tier of regional government is symmetric). In the empirical
section, I will therefore estimate the effect on conflict of both decentralisation and regional
autonomy, as well as the interaction between the two.
2.5 Summary and research hypotheses
The conceptual discussion can be summarised through the following five testable hypothe-
ses. First, I expect decentralisation to be related to the potential of secessionist conflict
(and to the likelihood of such conflict to succeed). This will have important implications
for the empirical strategy as I will need to account for the fact that decentralisation and
conflict are simultaneously determined. Second, I expect territorially concentrated, lo-
cally dominant ethnic groups to be more often involved in conflict. Third, I expect these
groups to enjoy wider autonomy than other groups as central governments will resort to
decentralisation/autonomy to appease secessionist tendencies. Fourth, the relationship
between regional autonomy, self-rule and shared-rule and civil war is not clear from the
summary of the literature. Arguments for both a negative or positive relationship have
been developed above and the purpose of the empirical section will be to provide evidence
on which are consistent with the data. Fifth, provided that decentralisation/autonomy
dampens conflict, I expect that this impact is stronger for groups that are locally domi-
nant than for others.
3 Data
To explore whether decentralisation prevent or mitigate ethnic conflict, past quantitative
studies have used two strategies. The first one is to treat ethnic groups as the unit of
analysis and to estimate how decentralisation or federalism measured at the country-level
influences conflict (Cohen 1997, Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni & Stanton 2002, Tranchant
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2008). Historically, the most comprehensive source of information on ethnic groups was
the “Minorities At Risk” database (Minorities at Risk Project 2009). In its latest version,
this dataset covers 284 ethnic groups worldwide and annually between 1985 and 2006.
The main problem associated with the use of this dataset is that it selects groups on
the basis on past violence and/or discriminations. As argued by Hug (2013), this casts
doubts on the external and internal validity of studies of conflict based on MAR data.
The second strategy is to take countries as the level of analysis and pool information
from all ethnic groups in a country together (Bakke & Wibbels 2006, Brancati 2006,
Christin & Hug 2012). This circumvents the sample selection issue but it also obscures
vital within-country heterogeneity in terms of conflict. For instance, the protracted con-
flict in Aceh caused Indonesia to be coded as in civil war in 1989 and 1990 and between
1999 and 2005, yet Aceh only represents about 2% of the country population. In addition,
the process of aggregation obscures the mechanisms at work as the analysis is not directly
informative of actors’ behaviours.
Papers based on both strategies ignore that decentralisation is not uniformly imple-
mented within countries. Datasets of decentralisation or federalism commonly used in
the literature only characterise countries as a whole. Recently Cederman et al. (2015)
improved on the state of the art by providing information on territorial autonomy enjoyed
by every groups listed in the Ethno-Power Relations dataset (EPR). The EPR dataset
aims to cover all politically relevant ethnic groups in the world to avoid sample selection
bias. Thus, by merging information on territorial autonomy with the EPR dataset they
are able to provide a group-level analysis of territorial autonomy and conflict that does
not suffer from issues of selection selection bias.
In this paper I intend to add to the group-level analysis of conflict by merging in-
formation from the EPR dataset with information from the Regional Authority Index
dataset (RAI). The RAI dataset provides a wide array of information on decentralisa-
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tion between 1950 and 2010 for every regional governments in 81 countries. The RAI
dataset provides a richer and more nuanced picture of decentralisation than the territo-
rial autonomy variable proposed by Cederman et al. (2015). In particular, it allows me
to distinguish between regional autonomy, self-rule and shared-rule as well as between
regional governments’ authority on policy, representation and taxation.7 In the next sec-
tion I will give more information on the EPR and RAI datasets and on the variables I
will use in the analysis.
3.1 Information on ethnic groups and civil war
The Ethno-Power Relations (EPR) database compiled by Vogt, Bormann, Rüegger, Ce-
derman, Hunziker & Girardin (2015) circumvents issues of sample selection bias by col-
lecting data on all politically relevant ethnic groups in the world - irrespective of whether
these groups have a history of violence and/or discriminations. The latest version of
the dataset (the EPR Core Dataset 2014) covers 856 groups and provides yearly infor-
mation between 1946 and 2013 on groups’ demography, spatial characteristics, or access
to power. Moreover, the EPR dataset matches each ethnic group to the UCDP Actor
Dataset (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2014) and to the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict
Database (ACD) (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg & Strand 2002) which al-
lows me to know whether rebel groups linked to a given ethnic group in the EPR dataset,
through ethnic claim or ethnic recruitment, are involved in armed conflict. The EPR has
been used in numerous studies since its publication.
7This dataset has seldom be used in conflict studies, probably due its initial modest coverage of 42 - mainly
OECD - countries. An exception is Brown (2009). In recent years the dataset has expanded its geographical
focus.
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3.2 Information on decentralisation and regional autonomy
Decentralisation data for countries outside of the OECD are patchy. Most datasets are
only available for a limited number of countries and/or points of time; as such they do not
allow the use of panel data methods. The IMF provides decentralisation data (through
the Government Financial Statistics) on an annual basis between 1972 and 2001 but it
is available only for 40-50 countries each year. The main limitation of the GFS data is
that they do not distinguish between genuine and apparent decentralisation. Countries
in which an important share of state expenditures are managed by local governments
seem to be very decentralised even of the autonomy of local governments is low (through,
e.g. the use of conditional grants). Although the data provide some information on the
extent of “vertical imbalance”, it is not obvious how best to combine the information.
Furthermore, collection of these data have been discontinued after 2001.
Instead I use the Regional Autonomy Index (RAI) database compiled by Hooghe,
Marks, Schakel, Osterkatz, Niedzwiecki & Shair-Rosenfield (2016). The dataset covers
81 countries in all regions of the world except Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia be-
tween 1950 and 2010. Apart from its wide temporal and geographic coverage, the RAI
dataset has two useful features for this analysis. First, it uses regional governments as
the unit of data collection.8 RAI reviews up to five tiers of regional governments in each
country9. This approach accommodates the fact that decentralisation levels often vary
within countries. Insofar as ethnic groups are territorially concentrated RAI can be used
to precisely document the level of decentralisation they enjoy through regional and local
governments.
Second, the RAI dataset provides an array of variables describing the degree of auton-
omy, self-rule and shared-rule of regional governments. This is an improvement over data
8Country scores are available, but they are a weighted average of regional governments scores.
9Regional governments with less than 150,000 people on average are not included.
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sources that reduce decentralisation to a single number. Regional autonomy is described
by a binary variable which takes the value 1 if the region is “exempt from the country-wide
constitutional framework and receives special treatment” (Hooghe et al. 2016). Self-rule
is measured as the sum of five indicators: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal auton-
omy, borrowing autonomy and representation. Institutional depth (which ranges between
0 and 3) measures the degree of institutional autonomy of regional government from the
centre. Policy scope (0-4) measures the authority of regional governments in terms of
policy-making. Fiscal autonomy (0-4) measures the authority of regional governments in
terms of revenue (i.e. tax rates and tax bases). Borrowing autonomy measures the ex-
tent to which regional governments (0-3) can borrow. Representation (0-4) measures the
capacity of regional actors to select regional office holders in the executive and legislative
assemblies.
As discussed above, arguments in favour of decentralisation tend to revolve around the
mechanisms of preference-matching (captured by self-rule) and accountability or political
decentralisation (captured by representation). The distinction between authority in policy
matters (i.e. institutional depth and policy scope) and authority in taxation matters
(fiscal and borrowing autonomy) can also be made in the data. Arguments revolving
around the idea of ethnic security dilemma can be tested by looking at the degree of
shared-rule. Shared-rule is measured as the sum of five indicators. Law making (0-2)
measures the capacity of regions to influence law making process. Executive control (0-2)
measures to which extent central and regional governments share authority. Fiscal control
(0-2) and borrowing control (0-2) measures whether regions have authority over fiscal and
borrowing policies of the centre, respectively. Constitutional reform (0-3) measures the
degree to which the assent of regional actors is needed to make constitutional changes.
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3.3 Matching information on ethnic groups with informa-
tion on decentralisation
For each spatially concentrated ethnic group in countries covered by both EPR and RAI,
I identified the regional tiers of government corresponding to the area it lives in.10 For
instance, for the Basque group in Spain, I use the decentralisation scores associated with
the provincias which were the unique tier of regional government in Spain until 1978.
From 1979 to 2010, I assign to the Basques the decentralisation score associated with
the autonomous region of Euskadi/País Vasco, where a majority of the Basque people
live. RAI documents more than one regional tier. Thus, from 1979 onwards, I also
assign to the Basque group the decentralisation score associated with the second tier of
regional government, for which there are three in the autonomous Basque country region:
Araba/Álava, Gipuzkoa/Guipúzcoa and Bizkaia/Vizcaya11.
For each ethnic group in the dataset, I also identify whether it is a local majority
within the boundaries of each relevant regional government. The arguments in favour
of decentralisation hinge on the ability of ethnic groups to control or be heard from
regional governments. Groups that are spatially concentrated but which are small even
at the regional level might not benefit from decentralisation as much (Tranchant 2008). I
have used several general and country-specific sources (censuses, academic works, online
encyclopaedia, the “ethnologue” etc) to find out whether each group was a local majority
(or the largest group) within the regional governments identified by RAI, for every years.
Overall a group is considered to be a local majority if it is a majority within the boundaries
of at least one tier of regional government.
To obtain the overall decentralization score, I follow the instructions of Hooghe et al.
10For groups that are territorially concentrated but have a minority of their members living elsewhere, I used
the region in which the majority of the group is.
11As each of these divisions have the same decentralisation score, it did not matter which was was chosen
nor did I need to create a composite index. Cases where several second or third tiers of regional government
exist are actually virtually non-existent in the dataset.
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(2016) and add up decentralisation indicators across all tiers of governments.12 This
means that, ceteris paribus, the more tiers of regional governments there are, the higher
the decentralisation score. To account for this, I will control for the number of tiers of
regional governments in all regressions. Looking at the effect of the number of tiers of gov-
ernments is also interesting in its own right as one argument in favour of decentralisation
is that it spreads power over multiple centres, thus reducing the intensity of contest for
the control of each of these. In contrast, one drawback of decentralisation is the potential
lack of coordination between centres of decision-making, which arguably grows worse as
the number of tiers of governments increase.
In the analysis I will use the following variables: self-rule and shared-rule, which sums
the score for self-rule and shared rule, respectively, across all tiers of regional govern-
ment. I will also look at policy, which sums the score for institutional depth and policy
scope across all regional governments; and fiscal autonomy, which sums the score for fis-
cal autonomy and borrowing autonomy across all tiers of regional governments. I will
also look at representation which adds up representation scores for each tier of regional
government and can be used to test whether decentralisation operates through the ac-
countability mechanism. Finally I use the variable autonomy which takes the value 1 if
at least one tier of regional government has an autonomous status, according to RAI.
12Adding up decentralisation scores across tiers ensures that international comparisons are valid. For instance,
Russia introduced in 2000 a new first tier of regional government: the Federalnyye okruga. Those are mostly
statistical entities with very little power (they score 1 for self-rule and 0 for shared-rule). The erstwhile first
tier of regional governments, i.e. the Republics and the Federal subjects, still exist and enjoy quite substantial
autonomy (the score for self-rule is about 14, that for shared-rule is about 8, with variation across republics
and over the years) but are now a second tier of regional government. If I were to look at the first tier of
governments in isolation, I would mistakenly conclude that decentralisation drastically decreased in 2000 in
Russia, where in fact it remained largely constant.
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3.4 External validity
Although RAI has a wider geographic coverage then other datasets on decentralisation, it
unfortunately still leaves out Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. As a result, the sample
used in the analysis includes 289 ethnic groups out of the 856 that are listed in the full
EPR dataset. Groups in the analysis sample are less affected by civil war than all groups
in the EPR dataset: out of 45,223 group-years in total in the full dataset, 1,444 group-
years are classified as in civil war (corresponding to an incidence rate of conflict of 3.1%).
In the analysis sample I use for the estimations, out of the total of 11,211 group-years,
204 are classified as in civil war (corresponding to an incidence rate of 1.9%). Although
the absolute numbers of group-years in conflict in the sub-sample are still large enough
to justify an econometric analysis, it is important to characterise how the analysis sample
differs from the full sample in order to keep an eye on external validity.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on ethnic groups’ status for the full EPR sample
and for the analysis sample used in the paper. Columns (1) and (2) show that ethnic
groups in the analysis sample are much more likely to have a monopoly or dominant access
to power. They are also less likely to be senior or junior partners in the central government
and are a lot bigger. The proportion of self-excluded, powerless and discriminated groups,
however, is roughly comparable across the two samples.
The subsequent analysis will exclude monopoly and dominant groups (which are not
concerned by decentralisation as a conflict-mitigation tool). The comparison of sample
characteristics on excluded groups only (columns 3-4) show that most differences seen
in columns (1-2) dramatically decrease.13 Importantly, the proportion of self-excluded,
powerless or discriminated groups (which together form most of the groups in conflict)
and the relative size of groups are very similar across the two samples.
The incidence of civil war is about 60% lower in the analysis sample than in the
13However, they remain statistically significant due to the very large sample size.
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full EPR sample (2.8% against 4.4% based on excluded groups). EPR distinguishes
between civil wars fought for territorial reasons ans civil wars fought for the control of
the government. In the analysis sample, the proportion of the former is much higher than
in the full sample. As a result, looking at the incidence of territorial civil wars alone, the
difference between the two samples becomes smaller (2.2% against 2.9%).
The analysis sample is more distinct from the full sample in terms of country char-
acteristics. Table 2 shows that countries in the analysis sample are significantly larger,
more populous, more democratic and more wealthy in countries than countries in the
full sample. They are also clearly less diverse, with almost one less politically relevant
group on average than in countries of the full sample. The most striking difference is on
democracy. Whereas countries in the analysis sample are much more democratic than
autocratic (average polity 2 score of 5.4), countries in the full sample have more autocratic
features than democratic ones (average polity 2 score of -1.9). Given these differences,
it is plausible that any conflict-mitigating effect of decentralisation found in the analysis
sample may not translate for groups out-of-sample, which are located in countries where
conditions are less favourable. Indeed, whether decentralisation could help achieving in
peace in poor, autocratic and fragmented countries is debatable given the findings of the
empirical literature reviewed in sections 1 and 2.
3.5 Summary statistics
Summary statistics are displayed in table 3. The evolution of civil wars and territorial
civil wars in the analysis sample over the period 1950-2010 is depicted in figure 1. The
incidence rate of civil wars strongly increases during the 1960s and until the latter part
of the 1970s. From then on, the incidence rate of civil wars continues to increase but
at a lower rate and incidence reaches a peak in 1984-1987 (5.1%). The rate of incidence
then quickly stabilises at about half its peak level (2%) in the early to mid-1990s. In
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the period following 1997, the incidence rate of civil hovers between 1.5% and 2%. The
pattern is similar for territorial civil wars albeit with slightly lower rates.
The evolution of decentralisation is depicted in figures 2, 3 and 4. Figure 2 displays
the evolution of the average number of tiers of regional governments. It shows that
the trend has been upwards for almost the entire period of the study, starting with an
average number of 1.2 tiers in 1950 and reaching a peak of 1.45 in 2004. Between 2004
and 2010, the average slightly decreased to 1.42. Figure 3 displays the evolution of
self-rule which is the aggregate score for self-rule across all regional governments in a
country. The figure also displays the evolution of the five indicators making up the self-
rule score (i.e. institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy
and representation). Whereas self-rule score was mostly stable between 1950 and 1970
(between 7 and 8), it trended upwards between 1982 and 2004 where it eventually reached
a score of 11.1. Since 2004, self-rule has slightly decreased to 10.3 in 2010. All individual
components of self-rule have experienced a rise over the period that mirrors that of the
index as a whole. One exception is representation which started at a high level (more
then 3) in the 1950s, went down until the early 1980s and then rose until 2010 to finish at
3.3 in 2010. Figure 4 shows that the score for shared-rule slightly decreased between 1950
and 1966 (where it went from 2 to 1.7). Shared-rule then increased steadily and reached
a maximum value of 3.3 in 2004. Between 2004 and 2010, shared-rule slightly decreased
to 3.1 in 2004. Law making and Constitutional reform followed a similar evolution over
the period. These two components put together also represent most of the shared-rule
aggregate score. Fiscal control and Executive control have steadily risen from the early
1980s on, albeit from a slow base. Borrowing control remained mostly flat, and close to
0, for the entire period.
When one looks at the co-evolution of decentralisation and civil wars, the relationship
is not obvious. Until the 1980s, it looks as if the increase of decentralisation matches
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the rise of civil wars. After this point, however, civil wars incidence goes down while
decentralisation scores keep getting higher.
Coming back to the five hypotheses of section 2, I expected locally dominant groups
to be more involved in civil wars and to be more likely to live in autonomous regions than
others. Indeed, the incidence rate of civil wars for local majorities, which stands as 2.9%,
is significantly higher than the corresponding rate for local minorities (0.8%). Likewise
14.1% of local majorities live in an autonomous region against 5.8% of local minorities.
These stark differences justify looking at whether decentralisation and regional autonomy
exert similar effects on both types of groups. They also underscore that regional autonomy
and decentralisation are used by central governments strategically, based on the potential
for groups to secede or rebel. Bivariate associations between decentralisation and civil
war are displayed graphically in figures 5-9. They show that incidence of civil war seems
strongly related to all measures of decentralisation, albeit in a non-linear way. There
always is a threshold above which any increase in decentralisation is associated with
more risk of civil war. I will then include in the regressions some specifications where
decentralisation and conflict are allowed to be related through a quadratic function.
Regional autonomy, however, does not appear to be related to civil war. The incidence
rate of civil wars for groups with access to an autonomous region is 3.3%, which is not
statistically different from that of the other groups (2.8%). This can signal a lack of
association between the two variables but it is also consistent with the observation that
central governments are more likely to grant autonomy status to groups with the highest
potential of violence. The following section turns to multivariate regressions.
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4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Decentralisation and conflict incidence
I start by estimating the effect of decentralisation on the incidence of ethnic conflict.
Following Elbadawi & Sambanis (2002), I define incidence of conflict to include both
onset of new conflicts and continuation of existing conflicts.14 For the estimations to
yield a causal impact of decentralisation on conflict, three threats to the identification
must be dealt with. The first one stems from unobserved heterogeneity. Important factors
determining the choice of ethnic groups to mobilise through violent means are not well
measured, such as the coherence of the group, the expectations of group leaders on their
chance of success through conflict or the feasibility of rebellion. Some of these can be
proxied by, say, measures of group size, roughness of terrain or GDP per capita, but it
is dubious that all relevant factors can be accounted for. In case they are not, they will
be in the error term of the equation to be estimated, and cause a correlation between
the covariates and the error term (omitted variable bias). The second threat is reverse
causality. This is due to the fact that states do not decentralise at random. Panizza
(1999) and Arzaghi & Henderson (2005) show that countries predicted to be confronted
by separatist demands (i.e. mostly large and diverse countries) tend to be more fiscally
decentralised. This indicates that states which are confronted by separatist demands
strategically respond by increasing decentralisation. The third threat is due to conflict
dynamics. Insofar as past conflict influences the likelihood of conflict in the future, then
one must include the past levels of conflict in the estimation. Ignoring conflict dynamics
is likely to cause omitted variable bias as past conflict (which would be in the error
term) is correlated with contemporaneous conflict (and other covariates). Including lags
of the dependent variable in the estimation is also problematic as, by construction, such
14Elbadawi & Sambanis (2002) refers to prevalence and not to incidence but the definition of the variable of
interest is the same.
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variables are correlated with the error term.
I will use the difference GMM estimator, which yields consistent estimates even in
the presence of all three threats. I will also allow decentralisation to exert a curvilinear
impact on conflict, as suggested by figures 5-9, through the inclusion of a squared term.
4.2 Identification strategy
I model the prevalence of conflict as the probability of group i in country j at time t to
engage in conflict (Cijt = 1) conditional on the lagged conflict status (Cijt−1), decentral-
isation level enjoyed by group i in the area it primarily resides in (Dij−1t), a vector of
group characteristics (Xijt−1), a vector of country characteristics (Sjt−1), the number of
continuous years of peace (Pijt−1), a set of group-specific effects (µij) and a linear time
trend (ηt). The regression to be estimated is:
Cijt = β1Cijt−1 + β2Dijt−1 + β3Xijt−1 + β4Sjt−1 + β5Pijt−1 + µij + ηt + uijt (1)
Where uijt is an error term and β2 the parameter of interest. All covariates are lagged
by one year to alleviate concerns of simultaneity bias.
The conflict variable Cijt is a binary variable that typically calls for the use of a
non-linear estimator (logit or probit). However, I choose to resort to linear estimators
throughout the empirical analysis as I intend to implement an instrumental variables
approach as the favourite specification, namely the difference system GMM estimator.
As I alluded to above, this estimator is the only one that can credibly deal with all three
threats to identification. However, this estimator is linear and corresponding non-linear
models are either non-existent or difficult to implement. The downside of fitting linear
models to limited dependent variable is that expectations of the dependent variable are
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not constrained within the [0, 1] interval. However Hyslop (1999) shows that dynamic
linear models with fixed effects produce very similar results than the corresponding non-
linear models.
To deal with all three threats to identification, I use the difference GMM estimator
proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991). The estimator removes the unobserved heterogene-
ity by first-differencing every variables in equation (1) :
∆Cijt = β1∆Cijt−1 +β2∆Dijt−1 +β3∆Xijt−1 +β4∆Sjt−1 +β5∆Pijt−1 +∆ηt +∆uijt (2)
Considering that Dijt− 1 is endogenous in equation (2), Arellano & Bond (1991)
show that one can use the second and higher lags of the endogenous regressor (i.e. Dijt−3,
Dijt−4...) as instruments for ∆Dijt−1. These instruments are valid as long as the errors
uijt are not serially correlated. In case the errors are serially correlated through an AR(2)
process but not an AR(3) process, then using the third and higher lags as instruments
would still be valid (Roodman 2009).
The downside of the difference GMM estimator is that it often yields relatively weak
instruments. However, this is not the case here. For each decentralisation variable that
will be considered later, the second to fifth lags of the level of decentralisation taken
together are very strongly correlated with the subsequent changes in decentralisation. To
see that, I run a series of instrumental variables regressions in a first-difference framework
(IV-FD) that reproduce the difference GMM estimations.15 This allows me to check the
strength of the instruments. For each decentralisation variable, I find that the F statistic
associated with the first stage regressions is between 20 and 50, much higher than the
rule-of-thumb value of 10 (Stock, Wright & Yogo 2002). The AP chi-squared test of
15The difference between the two is that the GMM estimator builds instruments following the procedure
proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey & Rosen (1988) to increase sample size. See Roodman (2009) for further
details.
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underindentification is also emphatically rejected. The same is true for GDP per capita
which I will also consider to be endogenous in equation (2).16
To increase efficiency Arellano & Bover (1995) proposes to use the difference of the
endogenous regressors as an additional set of instruments (which yields the so-called
system GMM estimator). However, ∆Dit−1 is a valid instrument only if Cov(∆Dijt−1 ×
uijt) = 0. As Roodman (2009) notes, this is similar to a stationarity assumption; and
this assumption is not warranted in this sample. A Hadri LM test of stationarity rejects
the null hypothesis that decentralisation is stationary in many countries where civil wars
happened, such as Spain, the Philippines or Russia. Although the test does not reject
the null in countries that did not experience civil wars since WW2, such as the United
States or France, the upshot of the stationarity tests is that the identifying assumption
of the system GMM is not met in this sample.17 I will then only the difference GMM
estimator.
4.3 Control variables
Vectors Xijt and Sjt control for time-varying group- and country-level controls, respec-
tively. The size of ethnic groups is often assumed to be an indicator for the group’s
mobilisation capacities (Wimmer, Cederman & Min 2009). I follow Christin & Hug
(2012) and enter group size in a quadratic manner in the regression to account for the
fact that medium-sized groups are the most likely to rebel. Small groups lack the capacity
to sustain a rebellion and large groups are unlikely to be excluded and/or need to engage
in large-scale violence to obtain satisfaction. I control for groups’ access to power as
excluded groups are more likely to be involved in conflict and be the recipient of special
autonomy status. The variables of access to power provided by EPR are: senior partner,
16Results on all first-stage regressions are available upon request.
17I cannot provide the result of the Hadri LR test for the entire sample as the panel dataset is not balanced;
I then ran the Hadri LR test separately within countries.
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junior partner, self-excluded, powerless and discriminated.
Decentralisation tends to be more common in democracies. To avoid conflating the
effect of decentralisation with the one of democracy, I use the polity2 score provided by
the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Jaggers & Gurr 2011). The polity2 score consists of
the sum of the democracy score (on a scale of 0-10) and the autocracy score (-10 for full
autocracy features, 0 for complete absence of autocracy feature). The overall polity score
thus ranges from -10 (pure autocracy) to +10 (pure democracy).
Panizza (1999) and Arzaghi & Henderson (2005) suggest that GDP per capita and the
size and heterogeneity of countries are correlated with fiscal decentralisation. Since these
factors arguably predict conflict as well, they must be controlled for. From the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators 2014 , I extract the GDP per capita in constant
2005 US dollars, the population size and the land area of the country (in miles). To
proxy for ethnic heterogeneity, I use the number of politically relevant ethnic groups in
a country according to EPR. Including population, land area and GDP per capita in the
regressions causes the number of observations in the estimations to drop from about 5,000
to 4,000.
I also use the EPR dataset to control for number of years of peace and number of
years of conflict, as well as for a variable taking the value 1 if the group was involved in
conflict in the past (War history).
5 Baseline Results: Decentralisation and incidence
of ethnic civil wars
I start with estimating the effect of decentralisation on the incidence of civil wars for all
ethnic groups that are territorially concentrated and which do not enjoy a dominant or
monopoly access to power. In all tables of results that follow, I sequentially estimate the
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effect of various measures of decentralisation. In column (1) the variable of interest is
self-rule, in column (2) I include the squared term of self-rule, in column (3) I look at
policy decentralisation, fiscal autonomy and the interaction between the two, in column
(4) I look at representation, in column (5) at shared-rule and in column (6) at shared-rule
and shared-rule squared.
Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of equation 2 with difference GMM
(as proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991)). In these specifications, all variables are first-
differenced to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity, and the change in decentralisation
is then instrumented by the second to fifth lags of the levels of decentralisation.18 In
the absence of serial correlations of the error term, such an instrumentation is valid and
addresses the reverse causality issue. I chose to use 4 lags of the decentralisation variables
to ensure sufficient strength of the instruments while maintaining computation ease.19
The effect of self-rule appears to be negative and statistically significant at the 10%
level. The magnitude of the effect is large (-0.0042) as an increase of one standard devia-
tion of self-rule would lead to a reduction of the risk of civil war by 70% (-0.032). There
is no evidence of a quadratic effect of self-rule (column (2)) and none of policy decen-
tralisation, fiscal autonomy and the interaction of the two exert a statistically significant
impact on the likelihood of civil wars. The coefficient associated with Representation,
however, is significantly negative (-0.016) at the 5% level. The point estimate is also very
large in absolute value. An increase of one standard deviation in the index of represen-
tation would reduce the risk of civil war by 0.041 whereas the average risk of civil war
in the sample is 0.045. Shared-rule is not a statistically significant predictor of conflict.
The number of regional governments is positively associated with risk of civil war, and
18All independent variables enter the regressions with a lag. The second to fifth lag of the lag of the
endogenous variable thus correspond to the third to sixth lags of the contemporary endogenous variable.
19I also consider the number of regional governments and the log of GDP per capita as endogenous in the
difference GMM estimations. The results are robust to varying the variables that are considered endogenous;
results are available upon request.
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the effect is significant at the 5% level in two specifications and at the 10% level in one
specification. This suggests that increasing the number of layers of governments may fuel
conflict through the ensuing loss of policy coordination.
Civil wars in the past year is a strong predictor of contemporary conflict. Groups that
are junior partner are less likely to engage in conflict that groups that are senior partners.
Other political statuses are unrelated to conflict. Contrary to expectations, the results
on the standalone and squared coefficient associated with relative size of groups suggest
that the risk of civil wars is lowest for mid-sized groups. However none of these terms
reach usual levels of statistical significance. War history, log GDP per capita, democracy,
population and years of peace are all unrelated to civil war. Ethnic fragmentation, how-
ever, is negatively associated with conflict (at the 10% level). Given that the regressions
are dynamic, this shows that a rise in the number of politically relevant ethnic groups
lowers the risk for each of these groups to engage in conflict.
5.1 Decentralisation, regional autonomy and incidence of
ethnic civil wars
So far I have only looked at decentralisation. I now introduce regional autonomy. In all
tables that follow, column (1) estimates the unconditional effect of regional autonomy
and column (2) estimates the effect of regional autonomy, self-rule and the interaction
between the two. Columns (3-6) replicate the analysis of column (2) with policy, fiscal
autonomy, representation and shared-rule, respectively.
With difference GMM, the effect of autonomy is consistently negative and statistically
significant. In columns (1), (3-4) and (6) of table 5 the coefficient associated with the
standalone effect of autonomy ranges between -0.14 and -0.18 and is significant at the 1%
or 5% levels. In columns (2) and (5) of table 5 the standalone coefficient of autonomy
is indistinguishable from zero but autonomy still exerts a significant conflict-mitigating
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impact through its interaction with self-rule and representation, respectively. The inter-
action term between autonomy and self-rule is estimated at -0.019 (significant at the 10%
level) and that between autonomy and representation is very large in absolute value (-
0.057) and is significant at the 1% level. This means that once we account for unobserved
heterogeneity and reverse causality, autonomy status appear to be a very strong factor
of ethnic peace. Quite remarkably, the results suggest that autonomous regions with no
authority on policy, fiscal autonomy or shared-rule still deter ethnic groups to participate
in conflict. However, it is the combination of autonomy and authority on self-rule, policy,
fiscal autonomy and representation which exerts the most potent impact on preventing
or stopping civil wars.
The standalone coefficients of decentralisation in table 5 yield the effect of decentrali-
sation for groups which do not have access to an autonomous region. In columns (2), (3)
and (4), which correspond to self-rule, policy and fiscal autonomy, respectively, this stan-
dalone coefficient is positive and statistically significant. This means that decentralisation
without autonomy is in fact fueling conflict. Representation and shared-rule, however, do
not fuel civil wars even when groups do not have access to an autonomous region.
This strong impact of autonomy and decentralisation is mostly apparent when both
variables are instrumented with a difference GMM estimator (pooled OLS or group fixed
effects estimations do not find a significant impact of autonomy). This echoes the findings
of Cederman et al. (2015) who also found the peace-promoting effect of autonomy to only
appear once they use an instrumental variables approach. This makes sense if central
governments are strategically using autonomy and decentralisation to curb ethnic conflict.
As long as central governments dislike giving away power through decentralisation and/or
granting autonomy status, we would expect to observe decentralisation and autonomy
status only when the threat of or damage from conflict is high. This creates a positive
relationship between decentralisation and autonomy on the one hand, and ethnic conflict
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on the other hand, which obscures any conflict-mitigating impact decentralisation and
autonomy might exert. By instrumenting decentralisation and conflict, one is able to
reveal the causal (and negative) impact of these two variables on conflict.
6 Robustness tests
I am testing the robustness of the results in a number of ways. Firstly, I am checking that
the results do not depend on the list of covariates included. Whereas group-level controls
are standard, the same is not true for country-level controls. Beyond population, GDP per
capita and democracy, one could consider including further country characteristics such
as size, elevation, presence of mountains and forest cover, institutions, oil reserves and so
forth. The difference GMM estimator already controls for all time-invariant characteris-
tics but not those that vary over time. Besides there exist other sources of measurement
for population, democracy and GDP per capita than those I used so far. Fortunately, the
results of this paper do not crucially depend on which covariates are included and how
they are measured.20 To avoid showing the results of multiple specifications, I will simply
display results of regressions that do not include any country-level controls altogether, in
table 8. These are quite close to the baseline results displayed in table 7. Autonomy is
still found to significantly reduce the incidence of ethnic war, independently of decentral-
isation, in column (1) and (5). Autonomy combined with policy and with representation
are also still found to exert a negative and significant effect on ethnic war (albeit the point
estimate of the latter is reduced in absolute value). Standalone decentralisation measures
are never significant predictors of ethnic civil war. Overall this exercise establishes that
the main result regarding autonomy does not hinge on the use of a particular empirical
specification.
In a second stage, I am considering a change in the dependent variable. The dependent
20All results are available upon request.
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variable used so far takes the value 1 if a given ethnic group takes part in any civil war.
Yet EPR further distinguishes between territorial and government civil wars. The former
category, which corresponds to wars fought on account of territorial incompatibility, is
most closely associated with secessionist wars involving ethnic minorities. Territorial civil
wars are also much more frequent than government ones and make up for 78% of civil wars
in the estimation sample. It is then interesting to check that the previous results of table
5 hold when the dependent variable of civil wars is restricted to territorial conflicts. Table
9 displays the results of the estimation of equation 2 with such a dependent variable. The
results are mostly the same and autonomy continues to exert a statistically significant and
meaningful negative impact on risks of ethnic wars. Still, the point estimate associated
with autonomy is slightly lower in absolute value in columns (1) and (6) and much lower in
column (4) where the coefficient goes to -0.075 from a value of -0.13 in table 5). The effect
of autonomy becomes indistinguishable from zero in column (3) but is now significantly
negative in column (5). The positive effect associated with the standalone coefficient
of self-rule in column (2) ceases to be significantly positive and the negative impact
associated with the interaction between autonomy and self-rule continues to be negative
and weakly statistically significant. The direct and indirect effects of decentralisation
measured by policy remain mostly unchanged. Fiscal autonomy is no longer fuelling
conflict when groups have no autonomy status and the interaction between representation
and autonomy is still statistically negative even though the impact becomes smaller in
absolute value (-0.022 against -0.057).
For the third robustness test I consider an alternative variable of autonomy, stemming
from EPR and Cederman et al. (2015). Whereas RAI defines regional autonomy on the
basis of a special status between regional governments and the center, EPR and Cederman
et al. (2015) define autonomy on the basis of territorial power-sharing between regional
and central governments. It is possible to see the EPR measure of autonomy, thus, as a
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combination of the autonomy and decentralisation variables from RAI. Table 10 display
the results of the estimation of equation 2 with the variable of regional autonomy from
EPR. In column (1) I restrict the sample to the corresponding one used in table 5 as
the variable of regional autonomy from EPR is available for a much larger sample than
that from RAI.21 The main result regarding the impact of regional autonomy holds. In
columns (1), (5) and (6) the effect of regional autonomy is negative and statistically
significant, although the point estimate and precision of the estimated coefficients are
smaller than in baseline results. The finding in the last two columns sugest that the
effect of autonomy operates irrespective of the level of decentralisation. None of the
interactions between autonomy and decentralisation are significantly different from zero.
Both of these results are consistent with the interpretation of the variable of autonomy
from EPR as a combination of the pure effects of autonomy (special relationship) and
substantial territorial power-sharing (decentralisation).
Finally, I check whether the results hold when I restrict the sample to local majorities.
I consider ethnic groups that are demographically dominant within the boundaries of
at least one regional government to be local majorities. While such local majorities
represent 50% of all the groups in the sample, they represent 80% of all the groups in
conflict. Groups that are local majorities can more credibly seek secession and mount
viable rebellions so that such concentration of ethnic conflicts within these groups is
not surprising (Fearon & Laitin 1999, Toft 2003). Local majorities are also more likely
to benefit from decentralisation as they can use their dominant local weight to send
representatives to the regional government. The regional median voter is also a member
of the given ethnic group. Given that local majorities have both high potential for violence
and can reap many benefits from decentralisation, it is interesting to explore what the
21Remarkably, when I do not restrict the sample, the point estimate of autonomy is the same (-0.17) irre-
spective of whether it is measured by RAI or EPR. When the latter is used, the sample size rises to 14,556
from less than 4,000 when the former is used.
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effect of decentralisation is on these groups’ propensity to engage in civil wars.
The results are displayed in table 11. Results of table 11 are very similar to those of
table 5 which presented the findings of the difference GMM estimations on all groups.
Both tables show that when the endogenous variables (i.e. regional autonomy and decen-
tralisation) are instrumented, they exert a significant conflict-mitigating effect. The lack
of meaningful differences between tables 11 and 5 suggest that the benefits of regional
autonomy and decentralisation are not confined to locally dominant ethnic groups.22
Finally, the results are robust to the inclusion of higher lags of the variables of interest.
In the baseline specification, I have lagged by one year all right-hand-side variables to help
alleviating the issue of reverse causality. It is, however, very possible that the dynamic
effect of decentralisation and autonomy is not well captured by a simple one-period lag.
When I include higher lags of autonomy and decentralisation, I find that the first and
second lags are the only ones to ever exert a statistically significant impact on subsequent
civil wars. The results do not change as the result of the introduction of higher lags. In
fact, the sum of the coefficients associated with the first and second lag is very close to
the coefficient associated with the single first lag of the baseline specifications. Changing
which variables are considered endogenous (which can be instrumented by second order
lag and higher) and which are considered predetermined (which can be instrumented by
first order lag and higher) also do not change the findings.23
22One might be worried by the low p-values of the AR(2) test in table 11. These are just above 10% and
do not give much confidence that the assumption of absence of serial correlation is met. However, when I use
the third to sixth lag of the endogenous variables (instead ot the second to fifth lags), the results are mostly
unchanged and the p-value associated with the AR(3) test rise to about 0.4, showing that the instrumentation
approach is valid. The results are available upon request.
23All these results are not shown to save space but are available upon request.
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7 Extension: onset and continuation of civil wars
Decentralisation and autonomy need not exert the same impact on conflict if implemented
during peace years or in the middle of a conflict. Cederman et al. (2015) rightly point
out that central governments which try to manage existing conflict by decentralisation
and/or autonomy may be perceived as weak by the rebels. This would encourage them
to continue or even increase their mobilisation in the conflict to either obtain secession
or simply more decentralisation/autonomy as part of a strategic game with the state.
To allow for decentralisation/autonomy to have a distinct effect depending on the
timing of implementation I will now estimate separate models for onset and continuation
of civil wars. The model for onset is given by:
Cijt|(Cijt−1 = 0) = β2Dijt−1 + β3Xijt−1 + β4Sjt−1 + β5Pijt−1 + µij + ηt + uijt (3)
This is the same model as described by equation 1 except that the dependent variable
is now only observed if the ethnic group i was not in conflict in the preceding year. Since
equation 3 conditions on past peace status, the lag of the dependent variable drops from
the list of covariates (as it is always equal to 0). The parameter of interest remains β2 but
it should now be interpreted as the effect of decentralisation/autonomy on the likelihood
of an onset of civil war involving group i.
The model for continuation is given by:
Cijt|(Cijt−1 = 1) = β2Dijt−1 + β3Xijt−1 + β4Sjt−1 + β5Wijt−1 + µij + ηt + uijt (4)
This equation is only estimated if group i was already in conflict in the preceding
year. The lagged dependent variable also drops from the equation and β5 now measures
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the effect of conflict duration, W , on the likelihood that the conflict continues. The
parameter of interest β2 should be interpreted as the effect of decentralisation/autonomy
on the likelihood that civil war that involved group i in the preceding year continues in
the present year.
It is a common strategy in studies of conflict to separate onset and continuation (or
duration) to account for the effect of conflict dynamics (Elbadawi & Sambanis 2002,
de Ree & Nillesen 2009). It is also close in spirit to the approach used by Cederman et al.
(2015) which contrasted the effect of autonomy on groups that have never been involved
in civil wars and groups that have at some point been involved in a civil war.
In the sample used in previous estimations, about 179 group-year were coded as in civil
war. These are broken down into 20 onsets of civil wars and 159 instances of continuing
conflict. Onsets are thus a rare event but conditioning on past peace status preserves
most of the sample size. Conversely, to study conflict continuation, I restrict the sample
to groups which were in conflict in the preceding year. The number of observations then
drops to 179 (corresponding to 12 groups observed during 15 years of conflict on average).
Out of these 179 observations, conflict is still present at time t in 159 cases, meaning that
cessation of conflict happens at a rate of 11.2%. The analysis on continuation needs to
be taken with caution given the small number of groups involved.
7.1 Decentralisation, regional autonomy and onset of civil
wars
Table 6 present results of the estimations of the onset equation 3 with difference GMM.
These suggest that autonomy on its own is not effective in preventing civil wars. On
the contrary, granting special autonomy status without giving actual authority to the
regional governments increases the risk of onset of civil wars. Likewise, decentralisation
without autonomy is unable to prevent civil wars (self-rule and fiscal autonomy without
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autonomous status is even found to increase the risk of onset, by 0.009 and 0.036 respec-
tively). However, decentralisation combined with autonomy leads to significantly lower
risk of civil wars. This is true when decentralisation is measured by self-rule, policy, fiscal
autonomy and representation. Both the standalone coefficient associated with shared-rule
and its interaction with autonomy are indistinguishable from zero.
Since the standalone effect of autonomy is positive and statistically significant in
columns (3) and (5) and the interactive terms between autonomy and decentralisation
are negative and significant in the same specifications, the overall impact of autonomy
is ambiguous. The full marginal effect of autonomy becomes negative when the index
of policy decentralisation reaches the value of 4.7 and when the index of representation
reaches a value of 3.4. The median value of both indices is 4 so it appears that regional
autonomy in conjunction with above-median decentralisation is effective at preserving
peace.
In sum, estimations of the onset of civil wars yield similar conclusions than those of
the incidence of civil wars, namely that a combination of decentralisation and autonomy
is an effective peace-promoting strategy but that both of them in isolation tend to be
either ineffective or counter-productive.
7.2 Decentralisation, regional autonomy and the continua-
tion of civil wars
Table 7 present results of the estimations of the continuation equation 4 with difference
GMM. Unlike for onset, autonomy is negatively and significantly associated with lower
risk that existing conflict continues. Decentralisation is mostly ineffective in putting
an end to civil wars. The only exception is the extent of representation which has a
strongly positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level) impact on the likelihood
that the conflict stops. There is no evidence that the effect of the interactions between
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decentralisation and autonomy are statistically different from zero. Given the low number
of observations, the results on continuation of conflict should be taken with caution and
suggestive at best that granting autonomy status - or increasing representation - are
the most effective strategy to end the participation of ethnic groups in civil wars while
increasing self-rule and shared-rule of regional governments does not seem to produce any
effect.
Beyond looking at onset and continuation of civil wars, I have also investigated
whether groups which do not enjoy autonomy while at least one other groups within
the country does are more likely to participate in wars. This would be consistent with
arguments by Cornell (2002) and Toft (2003) that autonomy granting sets precedent and
fuels a wave of separatist demands. I do not find evidence for this phenomenon. The same
applies when I look at groups enjoying less degree of self-rule than others in a country.24
8 Discussion and concluding remarks
In this paper, I have empirically revisited the links between decentralisation and ethnic
conflict. The paper adds to our understanding of the topic by addressing three limitations
of the current literature: i) it unpacks how decentralisation can mitigate conflict by con-
sidering various mechanisms of self-rule, shared-rule and regional autonomy as opposed
to a single number of decentralisation; ii) it matches information on all politically rele-
vant ethnic groups (from the EPR dataset) with the decentralisation and autonomy they
experience through the regional governments that rule their areas through the Regional
Autonomy Index dataset; and iii) it deals with unobserved heterogeneity and reverse
causality biases by using the difference GMM estimator (and establishing its validity for
the question at hand).
The core message of the empirical investigation is that regional autonomy is a powerful
24Results available upon request.
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institutional device to reduce risks of ethnic conflict. It lowers both the risk of onset of
new civil wars and that of continuation of existing civil wars. The effect of autonomy is
maximised when regional governments do enjoy substantial powers of self-rule (especially
to prevent onsets of new conflict) and political decentralisation is strong (ensuring a
fair representation of minorities in regional governments). Political decentralisation on
its own is a robust and significant factor of continued ethnic peace but it fails to end
existing civil wars. Self-rule and shared-rule on their own, i.e. without formal autonomy
of regional governments, are mostly ineffective and may even increase the odds of onset
of new conflicts. The magnitude of the estimated impact of autonomy on conflict risk
is significant. For instance, the combination of regional autonomy and wide-ranging
decentralisation reduces incidence of civil wars by about 60-70%.
The relevance of the findings for policy-makers is clear. The move towards decen-
tralised governance should not be resisted out of fear that it will unleash centrifugal forces.
On its own, increased decentralisation - whether in terms of policy and fiscal authority
or shared-rule - is found to be mostly unrelated to the incidence, onset and continuation
of ethnic civil wars. In addition, political decentralisation is found to be a robust and
quantitatively significant factor of ethnic peace. The most promising path to lower inci-
dence of ethnic civil war is regional autonomy, however. Regional autonomy reduces the
incidence and continuation of ethnic conflicts even when decentralisation is limited. The
effect of autonomy on incidence and onset of large-scale conflicts is maximised when com-
bined with wide-ranging powers of self-rule and representation by regional governments.
This means that peace-preservation strategies need to actively engage with grievances
from ethnic minorities, including through the design of a special regional rule. Simply
shifting decision-making authority to all regional and local governments is not as effective
a strategy. However, middle-of-the-road approaches where regional autonomy is granted
but regional governments have little actual power are ineffective or maybe dangerous and
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fuel risk of onset of large-scale conflicts.
The effect of regional autonomy is significantly different from zero only when the
variable is instrumented. This echoes the findings by Cederman et al. (2015) and further
establish that central governments strategically grant autonomy status in response to
threats or existence of ethnic conflict. This explains why ethnic groups which are local
majorities are both much more likely to participate in conflict and to enjoy autonomous
governments than local minorities. Once this strategic interaction is taken into account,
the paper reveals that a move towards regional autonomy does dampen the likelihood
and incidence of ethnic civil wars.
The paper has two main limitations that need to be acknowledged. Firstly, it only
looks at large-scale ethnic violence. It is possible that decentralisation and regional au-
tonomy exert different impact on low level rebellions or intergroup violence. Secondly, it
draws its conclusions from a sample that excludes sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia,
among other regions. It remains then unclear how decentralisation and regional autonomy
would work in countries that are more fragmented, poorer and less democratic.
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Table 1 Mean of group-level variables in the analysis and EPR samples
Sample EPR Analysis EPR Analysis
Politically Politically
Groups All All Excluded Excluded
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political Status:
Monopoly 0.053 0.114
Dominant 0.063 0.085
Senior partner 0.096 0.071 0.108 0.088
Junior partner 0.190 0.091 0.215 0.113
Self-excluded 0.016 0.007 0.018 0.009
Powerless 0.425 0.479 0.480 0.598
Discriminated 0.158 0.154 0.179 0.192
Relative size 0.182 0.239 0.128 0.115
Incidence of civil war 0.031 0.019 0.044 0.028
Incidence of territorial civil war 0.020 0.015 0.029 0.022
Note: author’s caculations based on the EPR dataset. The analysis sample refers to
the sample used in subsequent estimations. Sample size varies between 9,640 and 11,513
observations for the analysis sample and between 41,000 and 46,667 observations for the
full EPR sample.
Table 2 Mean of country-level variables in the analysis and EPR samples
Sample EPR Analysis
Mean Mean
(1) (2)
Log Population 15.791 16.370
Log Land area 12.216 12.467
Log GDP per capita 7.116 8.769
Polity 2 score -1.857 5.395
Number of ethnic groups 4.829 2.944
Source: author’s caculations based on EPR data.
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Table 3 Summary statistics of the analysis sample
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. N
Incidence of civil war 0.028 (0.165) 0 1 7215
Incidence of territorial civil war 0.022 (0.148) 0 1 7215
Relative size 0.115 (0.2) 0 0.939 7215
Relative size2 0.053 (0.151) 0 0.882 7215
Senior partner 0.088 (0.284) 0 1 7215
Junior partner 0.113 (0.317) 0 1 7215
Self-excluded 0.009 (0.093) 0 1 7215
Powerless 0.598 (0.49) 0 1 7215
Discriminated 0.192 (0.394) 0 1 7215
Downgraded 0.004 (0.066) 0 1 7215
War history 0.102 (0.42) 0 4 7215
Years of continuous peace 34.012 (19.695) 0 64 7215
Self-rule 10.584 (7.974) 0 49 7099
Policy 4.329 (2.971) 0 18 7099
Fiscal autonomy 2.889 (3.119) 0 19 7099
Representation 3.365 (2.53) 0 12 7099
Shared-rule 3.129 (3.878) 0 24 7099
Nb. of regional gvts. 1.385 (0.537) 0 3 7215
Regional autonomy (RAI) 0.148 (0.355) 0 1 7069
Territorial autonomy (EPR) 0.31 (0.463) 0 1 7215
Log of GDP per capita 8.723 (1.324) 5.617 10.986 5455
Polity2 score 5.552 (5.682) -9 10 7045
Log of population 16.757 (1.409) 13.688 19.55 5531
Log of land area 12.773 (1.647) 8.543 16.117 5340
Nb. of ethnic groups 7.824 (10.367) 2 39 7215
East Asia and Pacific 0.202 (0.402) 0 1 5531
Europe and Central Asia 0.396 (0.489) 0 1 5531
Latin America and Caribbean 0.306 (0.461) 0 1 5531
Middle East and North Africa 0.024 (0.154) 0 1 5531
North America 0.071 (0.257) 0 1 5531
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Figure 1 Incidence of civil wars in the analysis sample, 1950-2010
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Note: Average incidence calculated with a non-parametric local regression (lowess). Source: author’s
calculations based on EPR data.
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Figure 2 Number of regional governments in the analysis sample, 1950-2010
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Note: Average calculated with a non-parametric local regression (lowess). Source: author’s calculations based
on EPR data.
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Figure 3 Self-rule in the analysis sample, 1950-2010
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Note: Average calculated with a non-parametric local regression (lowess). Source: author’s calculations based
on EPR data.
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Figure 4 Shared-rule in the analysis sample, 1950-2010
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Note: Average calculated with a non-parametric local regression (lowess). Source: author’s calculations based
on EPR data.
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Figure 5 Self-rule and incidence of civil war in the analysis sample, 1950-2010
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Note: Average calculated with a non-parametric local regression (lowess). Source: author’s calculations.
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Figure 6 Policy decentralisation and incidence of civil war in the analysis sample, 1950-2010
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Note: Average calculated with a non-parametric local regression (lowess). Source: author’s calculations.
55
Figure 7 Fiscal autonomy and incidence of civil war in the analysis sample, 1950-2010
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Note: Average calculated with a non-parametric local regression (lowess). Source: author’s calculations.
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Figure 8 Representation and incidence of civil war in the analysis sample, 1950-2010
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Note: Average calculated with a non-parametric local regression (lowess). Source: author’s calculations.
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Figure 9 Shared-rule and incidence of civil war in the analysis sample, 1950-2010
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Note: Average calculated with a non-parametric local regression (lowess). Source: author’s calculations.
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Table 4 Difference GMM estimates of the effect of decentralisation on the incidence of ethnic
civil wars
Lagged covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-rule -0.0042* -0.0068
(0.0025) (0.0060)
Self-rule2 0.00011
(0.00020)
Policy -0.0085
(0.0059)
Fiscal autonomy 0.0035
(0.014)
Policy × Fiscal autonomy 0.00063
(0.0018)
Representation -0.016**
(0.0076)
Shared-rule -0.0034 -0.0028
(0.0040) (0.0042)
Shared-rule2 -0.00011
(0.00027)
Nb. of regional gvts. 0.067* 0.055 0.062** 0.088** 0.026 0.044
(0.039) (0.035) (0.028) (0.044) (0.026) (0.029)
Civil war 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.49*** 0.45*** 0.50*** 0.51***
(0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14)
Political status, r: senior partner
Junior partner -0.050 -0.061* -0.065* -0.066** -0.036 -0.036
Continued on next page
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(0.040) (0.033) (0.038) (0.032) (0.023) (0.022)
Self-exclusion 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.26 0.26
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19)
Powerless -0.017 -0.023 -0.019 -0.0016 0.0060 0.0071
(0.028) (0.031) (0.027) (0.035) (0.032) (0.034)
Discriminated 0.041 0.036 0.032 0.056 0.052 0.045
(0.047) (0.054) (0.055) (0.063) (0.060) (0.064)
Downgraded in last year -0.067 -0.063 -0.082 -0.059 -0.068 -0.063
(0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057)
Relative size -4.01 -4.10 -2.94 -3.67 -4.49 -4.65
(2.72) (2.73) (2.71) (2.99) (2.96) (3.04)
Relative size2 3.09 3.32 1.27 2.73 2.35 2.68
(2.28) (2.29) (2.35) (2.62) (2.21) (2.34)
War history -0.11 -0.12* -0.11 -0.10 -0.082 -0.074
(0.074) (0.070) (0.069) (0.078) (0.057) (0.059)
Log GDP per capita 0.053 0.062 0.050 0.028 0.061 0.066
(0.055) (0.043) (0.040) (0.073) (0.052) (0.052)
Polity2 score -0.00071 -0.000024 -0.0014 -0.00030 -0.00089 -0.00056
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0022)
Log population 0.078 0.095 0.068 0.052 0.079 0.066
(0.069) (0.068) (0.061) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052)
Nb. of ethnic groups -0.010* -0.0100* -0.0097* -0.0099* -0.010* -0.0096*
(0.0061) (0.0053) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0058)
Years of peace 0.0021 0.0017 0.00097 0.0024 0.0021 0.0022
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(0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0034)
Year -0.0028 -0.0029 -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0035 -0.0037
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0030)
Observations 4067 4067 4067 4067 4067 4067
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.433 0.461 0.395 0.390 0.355 0.339
Hansen overid. test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at country level. Sample of 111 groups.
All decentralisation variables and the log of GDP per capita are considered endogenous and are instrumented
by the second to sixth lags of their levels. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 5 Difference GMM estimates of the effect of autonomy and decentralisation on the
incidence of ethnic civil wars
Lagged covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Autonomy -0.17*** -0.045 -0.13** -0.13*** 0.018 -0.18***
(0.045) (0.071) (0.058) (0.036) (0.064) (0.031)
Self-rule 0.0074*
(0.0040)
Autonomy × Self-rule -0.019*
(0.0096)
Policy 0.017***
(0.0049)
Autonomy × Policy -0.025*
(0.014)
Fiscal autonomy 0.023*
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(0.012)
Autonomy × Fiscal autonomy -0.040
(0.026)
Representation 0.0059
(0.0094)
Autonomy × Representation -0.057***
(0.020)
Shared-rule 0.0018
(0.0068)
Autonomy × Shared-rule 0.00050
(0.012)
Nb. of regional gvts. 0.082* 0.020 0.010 0.060* 0.067 0.027
(0.045) (0.038) (0.036) (0.033) (0.055) (0.018)
Observations 3886 3886 3886 3886 3886 3886
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.336 0.309 0.294 0.324 0.281 0.243
Hansen overid. test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at country level. Sample of 111 groups.
All regressions include the lag of civil war and the same covariates as in table 4. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 6 Difference GMM estimates of the effect of autonomy and decentralisation on the onset
of civil wars
Lagged covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Autonomy 0.040 0.17 0.22* 0.063 0.25* 0.060
(0.097) (0.11) (0.13) (0.066) (0.15) (0.10)
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Self-rule 0.0090***
(0.0032)
Autonomy × Self-rule -0.023**
(0.0089)
Policy 0.014
(0.011)
Autonomy × Policy -0.047**
(0.019)
Fiscal autonomy 0.036***
(0.0081)
Autonomy × Fiscal autonomy -0.054***
(0.019)
Representation 0.011
(0.011)
Autonomy × Representation -0.073**
(0.031)
Shared-rule 0.0096
(0.0066)
Autonomy × Shared-rule -0.022
(0.013)
Nb. of regional gvts. 0.066 -0.0074 -0.0074 0.039 0.042 -0.034
(0.072) (0.034) (0.031) (0.037) (0.042) (0.065)
Observations 3707 3707 3707 3707 3707 3707
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.076 0.081 0.106 0.121 0.110 0.086
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AR(3) test (p-value) 0.478 0.528 0.476
Hansen overid. test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at country level. Sample of 107 groups.
All regressions include the same covariates as in table 4 except for the lagged dependent variable.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 7 Difference GMM estimates of the effect of autonomy and decentralisation on the
continuation of civil wars
Lagged covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Autonomy -0.40*** -0.19 -0.47* -0.42*** -0.16 -0.20
(0.13) (0.31) (0.24) (0.16) (0.16) (0.36)
Self-rule -0.032
(0.028)
Autonomy × Self-rule 0.0014
(0.029)
Policy 0.032
(0.046)
Autonomy × Policy 0.0042
(0.043)
Fiscal autonomy 0.035
(0.052)
Autonomy × Fiscal autonomy 0.0068
(0.062)
Representation -0.099**
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(0.046)
Autonomy × Representation -0.024
(0.052)
Shared-rule -0.023
(0.024)
Autonomy × Shared-rule -0.028
(0.11)
Nb. of regional gvts. 0.19 0.55 0.035 0.10 0.68* 0.22
(0.20) (0.46) (0.28) (0.24) (0.40) (0.24)
Observations 179 179 179 179 179 179
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.330 0.245 0.354 0.362 0.164 0.302
Hansen overid. test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at country level. Sample of 12 groups.
All regressions include the same covariates as in table 4 except for the lagged dependent variable.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 8 Difference GMM estimates of the effect of autonomy and decentralisation on the
incidence of civil wars: no country-level covariates
Lagged covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Autonomy -0.14* 0.0060 0.020 -0.052 -0.091** -0.14
(0.078) (0.096) (0.12) (0.052) (0.039) (0.088)
Self-rule 0.0044
(0.0049)
Autonomy × Self-rule -0.016
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(0.0095)
Policy 0.013
(0.0081)
Autonomy × Policy -0.038*
(0.021)
Fiscal autonomy 0.0059
(0.015)
Autonomy × Fiscal autonomy -0.032
(0.031)
Representation 0.0099
(0.0092)
Autonomy × Representation -0.027**
(0.011)
Shared-rule -0.0029
(0.0054)
Autonomy × Shared-rule 0.0086
(0.012)
Nb. of regional gvts. 0.10** -0.020 -0.030 0.029 0.0052 0.030
(0.048) (0.043) (0.040) (0.032) (0.039) (0.046)
Observations 4083 4083 4083 4083 4083 4083
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.196 0.192 0.175 0.196 0.158 0.143
Hansen overid. test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at country level.
All regressions include the same covariates as in table 5.
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*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 9 Difference GMM estimates of the effect of autonomy and decentralisation on the
incidence of territorial civil wars
Lagged covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Autonomy -0.13*** -0.035 -0.022 -0.075*** -0.092*** -0.15**
(0.036) (0.069) (0.088) (0.029) (0.029) (0.065)
Self-rule 0.0061
(0.0043)
Autonomy × Self-rule -0.014*
(0.0085)
Policy 0.014**
(0.0059)
Autonomy × Policy -0.034*
(0.017)
Fiscal autonomy 0.018
(0.012)
Autonomy × Fiscal autonomy -0.034
(0.027)
Representation 0.0069
(0.0088)
Autonomy × Representation -0.022**
(0.011)
Shared-rule -0.0046
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(0.0050)
Autonomy × Shared-rule 0.014
(0.0091)
Nb. of regional gvts. 0.044* -0.024 -0.028 0.022 0.00089 0.021
(0.026) (0.036) (0.032) (0.017) (0.034) (0.024)
Observations 3890 3890 3890 3890 3890 3890
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.169 0.162 0.140 0.184 0.129 0.117
Hansen overid. test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at country level.
All regressions include the same covariates as in table 5.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 10 Difference GMM estimates of the effect of autonomy and decentralisation on the
incidence of civil wars: Alternative measure of regional autonomy
Lagged covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Autonomy (EPR) -0.096* -0.074 -0.071 -0.060 -0.094* -0.084**
(0.050) (0.047) (0.053) (0.045) (0.054) (0.040)
Self-rule -0.0054
(0.0057)
Autonomy × Self-rule 0.0037
(0.0053)
Policy -0.0065
(0.011)
Autonomy × Policy 0.0052
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(0.011)
Fiscal autonomy 0.00044
(0.018)
Autonomy × Fiscal autonomy -0.0043
(0.018)
Representation -0.013
(0.010)
Autonomy × Representation 0.0089
(0.010)
Shared-rule 0.0011
(0.0034)
Autonomy × Shared-rule -0.0034
(0.0065)
Nb. of regional gvts. 0.037 0.042 0.028 0.027 0.040 0.012
(0.042) (0.040) (0.027) (0.033) (0.041) (0.035)
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.169 0.162 0.140 0.184 0.129 0.117
Hansen overid. test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at country level.
All regressions include the same covariates as in table 5.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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Table 11 Difference GMM estimates of the effect of autonomy and decentralisation on the
incidence of ethnic civil wars - local majorities only
Lagged covariate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Autonomy -0.25** -0.075 -0.12 -0.15** 0.065 -0.20**
(0.098) (0.12) (0.10) (0.072) (0.21) (0.083)
Self-rule 0.0057
(0.0057)
Autonomy × Self-rule -0.014
(0.0099)
Policy 0.015**
(0.0061)
Autonomy × Policy -0.031*
(0.017)
Fiscal autonomy 0.016
(0.013)
Autonomy × Fiscal autonomy -0.020
(0.025)
Representation -0.0086
(0.016)
Autonomy × Representation -0.061*
(0.033)
Shared-rule -0.0035
(0.0071)
Autonomy × Shared-rule 0.011
(0.014)
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Nb. of regional gvts. 0.086* 0.026 0.0096 0.061* 0.12* 0.028
(0.052) (0.033) (0.030) (0.035) (0.063) (0.023)
Observations 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035 2035
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.172 0.129 0.145 0.132 0.128 0.113
Hansen overid. test (p-value) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at country level. Sample of 60 ethnic groups.
All regressions include the lag of civil war and the same covariates as in table 4. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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